Contextualism without incompleteness by Marina Sbisá
1. The contextualist puzzle 
contextualism gets started when it is ob-
served that utterances of the same non-
indexical sentence occurring in different 
contexts may get different evaluations 
as to truth or falsity. let us cite some 
well-known examples, representative of 
some varieties of sentences for which 
the above-mentioned observation holds 
(albeit by no means exhaustive of those 
varieties and not meant to suggest a clas-
sification):
(1) John is ready.
(2) The apple is red.
(3) it’s raining. 
(4) There’s milk in the fridge.
(1) might be deemed to be true in a con-
text in which John’s readiness to go out 
in the rain is salient and false in a con-
text in which his readiness for an exam is 
at issue; (2) might be deemed to be true, 
with reference to the very same apple, if 
we are looking for ripe apples, but false if 
we are sorting sound apples from apples 
aBstract
after summarizing the main intuitions and lines 
of reasoning at the basis of contextualism, i fo-
cus on the so-called incompleteness argument. 
i examine the discussion and rejection of this 
argument by cappelen and lepore (2005) and 
recognize that there are indeed some puzzling 
aspects to the intuition upon which the argu-
ment is based. after discussing why the incom-
pleteness intuition seems to apply arbitrarily 
and be liable to infinite regress, and how it may 
have originated, i conclude that it is a mislead-
ing response to the situatedness of our speech 
and that it can be explained away without reject-
ing contextualism. 
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with red spots in their flesh; (3) might be deemed to be true or to be false depending 
on the salient location; (4) might be deemed to be false if we are looking for drinkable 
milk in the fridge, but true if we are checking whether all traces of spilt milk in our 
fridge have been cleaned up.
When we accept these considerations, we are already (generally speaking) in a con-
textualist frame of mind. But then we face a puzzle. such contextual variations in the 
evaluation of utterances as to truth or falsity apparently violate the well-established 
principle that the meaning of a sentence consists of its truth-conditions. for, if the ut-
tered sentence is the same, provided it is nonindexical and unambiguous, the meaning 
of its utterances should be the same; if meaning is truth-conditions, truth-conditions 
should be the same; if the different utterances are evaluated all in the same, usual ac-
tual world, their evaluation should yield the same truth-value. But something seems 
to go wrong in this chain in the case of utterances of such sentences as (1)-(4). There 
are three main explanations for the trouble it might be: (a) that the sentence is covertly 
indexical, (b) that it does not determine full-blown truth-conditions, or (c) that truth-
evaluation is not a matter of assigning a truth-value in a world to the sentence uttered, 
on the basis of its meaning, a truth-value in a world. The first solution is indexical (let 
us call it, with recanati 2004, “indexicalism”): it traces back the worrying contextual 
variation in truth-value to the well-known and delimited phenomenon of indexicality, 
at the price of enlarging the class of indexical expressions or of admitting of “hidden 
indexicals” to be filled in by resort to context (see e.g. stanley 2000). indexicalism may 
be considered a “moderate” form of contextualism (cappelen & lepore 2005, 8-9; Borg 
2007, 343-6), which saves the primacy of the rules of the language (as is noted by re-
canati 2004, 85 ff., who for this reason considers indexicalism as a kind of “literalism”, 
as opposed to contextualism). The second solution (often called “radical” contextual-
ism) claims that the semantics of the uttered sentence underdetermines the utterance’s 
truth-conditions and defers the final step in determining them to pragmatic processes. 
so for one sentence, used in different contexts, we may have several different expressed 
propositions while each of these propositions, evaluated at the actual world, yields a 
constant truth-value (Bezuidenhout 2002, carston 2002, recanati 2002). The third 
solution is rarely explored. it looks for the source of the trouble in the way in which 
meaning as truth-conditions, or as the proposition expressed by the utterance, is sup-
posed to link utterances of sentences to truth and falsity. 
here, i will not discuss the contrast between the indexicalist solution and the radical-
contextualist solution. i am interested in the contrast between these two solutions and 
possible solutions of the third kind. any such solution would introduce some economy 
into the ontology of semantics, by avoiding multiplying the meanings (or truth-condi-
tional contents, or propositions) to be attributed to utterances of the same sentence or 
even making propositions dispensable. recently, a “nonindexical contextualism” has 
been proposed (Macfarlane 2009), according to which utterances of the same sentence 
may well have the same meaning, and even express the same proposition, in differ-
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ent contexts, but differ in truth-value because of the different circumstances, fixed by 
context-dependent parameters, with respect to which they have to be evaluated. an-
other proposal comes from Gauker’s work on the role of context in semantics (1998, 
2003). in his (2003), Gauker presents a view of language which he admits to be a kind 
of contextualism (2003, 284-5): i will call it “objective contextualism”. in this view, sen-
tences are evaluated as assertible (and therefore true), deniable (and therefore false), or 
neither assertible nor deniable relative to the context pertinent to the conversation. a 
context is a structure built from linguistic objects (such as atomic sentences and nega-
tions of atomic sentences) and the contents of the context pertinent to a conversation 
are selected by the goals of the conversation and the state of the world (2003, 55-63). 
Both in Macfarlane’s and in Gauker’s view, the contextual variation in the truth-eval-
uation of utterances of the same sentence is explained as something that pertains to 
evaluation itself. The third solution to the contextualist puzzle they both pursue may 
therefore be called the “evaluationist” solution.
among the argumentative strategies that have been used to introduce or support con-
textualism there is what cappelen and lepore (2005) have discussed under the name 
of the incompleteness argument. This argument relies on incompleteness intuitions 
as regards the truth-conditions of sentences and supports radical contextualism in 
particular. cappelen and lepore (2005, 59-68) use it to reduce indexicalism to radi-
cal contextualism, but then reject the latter by arguing that the arguments supporting 
it, including the incompleteness argument, are flawed. They argue for the conclusion 
that contextualism should be abandoned altogether and support given to semantic 
minimalism, according to which utterances of sentences express in any case and first 
of all a “minimal proposition”, determined by the syntactic and semantic rules of the 
language and identifiable disquotationally (so that e.g. “John is ready” expresses the 
minimal proposition that John is ready). i will now examine the incompleteness argu-
ment and explore why it is flawed. i will suggest that disposing of it does not amount to 
rejecting contextualism altogether, but is compatible with an evaluationist solution to 
the contextualist puzzle. 
2. The Incompleteness Argument
here is my proposed reconstruction of the incompleteness argument, partly inspired 
by the reconstruction put forward by cappelen and lepore (2005, 11). i formulate the 
argument with respect to each of our examples (1)-(4), appending short comments.
(ia) (1) nina has uttered “John is ready”. is her utterance true or false? if the proposi-
tion expressed by her utterance were just that John is ready, that alone would not as-
sign to the utterance of “John is ready” its truth-value, because, intuitively, the world 
cannot be such that John is ready simpliciter (for example, John might be ready to go 
out but not ready for his exam). rather, what is expressed by the sentence “John is 
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ready”, namely, that John is ready, is not the entire proposition that its utterance is in 
the business of expressing. in order for an utterance of “John is ready” to be assigned 
its truth-value, its content has to be supplemented with more material, to be drawn 
from the context of utterance. so the truth-conditions of utterances of “John is ready”, 
and therefore the propositions they express, vary with context.
comment: here the problem is with the predicate “is ready”. its extension appears to 
change from one occasion to another. indeed, if “is ready” were assigned an invariant 
extension such as the set of all entities that are ready for something or other, “John is 
ready” should be deemed to be true on far more occasions of utterance than we actu-
ally deem it to be such. But it appears more intuitive to say that we cannot establish 
whether utterances of (1) are true or false unless we know with what aim or goal the 
predicate “is ready” is associated on the specific occasion.
(ia) (2) nina has uttered “The apple is red”. is her utterance true or false? if the propo-
sition expressed by her utterance were just that the apple is red, this alone would not 
assign to the utterance of “The apple is red” its truth-value, because, intuitively, the 
world cannot be such that the apple is red simpliciter (for example, the apple might be 
red in its flesh because of a fungus, but not be red on the outside). rather, what is ex-
pressed by the sentence “The apple is red”, namely, that the apple is red, is not the entire 
proposition that its utterance is in the business of expressing. in order for an utterance 
of “The apple is red” to be assigned its truth-value, its content has to be supplemented 
with more material, to be drawn from the context of utterance. so the truth-conditions 
of utterances of “The apple is red”, and therefore the propositions they express, vary 
with context.
comment: here the problem may be with the predicate or with that which it applies 
to. if we want to refer by “the apple” to a certain apple taken as a whole, we cannot as-
sign an invariant extension to “is red”, for that would include all things that are red in 
one part or other, which would make true more utterances of the sentence than our in-
tuitions would allow. if we want to assign to “is red” its most straightforward invariant 
extension (including all and only those things that are completely red), we have to take 
it as applying not to the apple as a whole, but to salient parts of it (the skin; the spots), 
or else most utterances of the sentence would turn out to be false.
 (ia) (3) nina has uttered “it’s raining”. is her utterance true or false? if the proposition 
expressed by her utterance were just that it’s raining, this alone would not assign to her 
utterance its truth-value, because, intuitively, the world cannot be such that it’s raining 
simpliciter (for example, it might be raining in trieste but not in rome). rather, what 
is expressed by the sentence “it’s raining”, namely, that it’s raining, is not the entire 
proposition that its utterance is in the business of expressing. in order for an utterance 
of “it’s raining” to be assigned its truth-value, its content has to be supplemented with 
more material, to be drawn from the context of utterance. so the truth-conditions of 
utterances of “it’s raining”, and therefore the propositions they express, vary with con-
text.
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comment: in case (3), the problem which arises is that getting the correct truth-condi-
tions for the utterance of the whole sentence requires us to specify the location where 
rain is said to occur. This may be due to the meaning of the verb ‘to rain’ (if, as sug-
gested by perry 1993, it denotes a relation between times and places) or to pragmatic 
reasons (as claimed by recanati 2002), that is, to the fact that in most occasions of use, 
we do not utter (3) to convey the trivial information that it is raining in any location 
whatsoever. in both cases the problem which arises with (3) tends to generalize: in the 
former, because other verbs may share with ‘to rain’ the property of denoting a relation 
involving places too; in the latter, because for any sentence whose utterances are likely 
to be trivially true, some expansion or enrichment is required in order to determine 
the correct truth-conditions of most of its utterances.
(ia) (4) nina has uttered “There’s milk in the fridge”. is her utterance true or false? if 
the proposition expressed by “There’s milk in the fridge” were just that there’s milk in 
the fridge, this alone would not assign to the utterance of “There’s milk in the fridge” 
its truth-value, because, intuitively, the world cannot be such that there’s milk in the 
fridge simpliciter. rather, what is expressed by the sentence “There’s milk in the fridge”, 
namely, that there’s milk in the fridge, is not the entire proposition that its utterance is 
in the business of expressing. in order for an utterance of “There’s milk in the fridge” 
to be assigned its truth-value, its content has to be supplemented with more mate-
rial, to be drawn from the context of utterance. so the truth-conditions of utterances 
of “There’s milk in the fridge”, and therefore the propositions they express, vary with 
context.
comment: With utterances of sentence (4) we affirm the presence of (some quantity 
of) a natural kind, milk, in a certain container, the fridge. how much milk, in what 
form, for what use, where exactly in the fridge, is not said. There is nothing incom-
plete in using “milk” to refer to a natural kind, but we might not count as presence of 
“milk”, on occasion, its presence in certain very small quantities, or in certain forms, 
or for certain aims. The fridge too is an object different parts of which may be sali-
ent on different occasions. The complexity of this case exemplifies what may be called 
“top-down” context-dependency (Bianchi 2001, 152-3), that is, the dependency of the 
whole proposition expressed by uttering (4) on the context as a whole, as opposed to 
the dependency of the interpretation of some component part of (4) on specific infor-
mation to be found in the context. 
The argument applies to (1) most intuitively. here it seems that what is expressed by 
“John is ready” is indeed in need of completion (Bach 1994), as if it had a linguistically 
mandated empty slot to be filled in by specifying the activity or event for which John is 
said to be ready. such applications of the argument can indeed be used to support in-
dexicalism. But already in case (2) the indexicalist solution loses credibility. of course 
what appears coloured is always an exposed surface. That’s how we come to see col-
ours. But should then “red”, like any other colour word, be analysed as meaning “red 
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on surface x”? rather, there seems to be something incomplete about the truth-condi-
tions of the attribution of a colour to an object, insofar as it is not specified what part 
or exposed surface of the object is referred to. The alleged incompleteness is no longer 
a matter of filling in an empty slot associated with the word “red” by linguistic rules: 
example (2) has in fact been used by Bezuidenhout (2002) in support of radical con-
textualism. Example (3) is even farther from being a manifest case of incompleteness. 
We may well feel that (3) is far from unable to determine a truth-value (Bach 1994, 
recanati 2004, 9-10): if it is raining at least in one location on earth, then it is literally 
true that it’s raining. still, it may be felt that the content expressed by the sentence “it’s 
raining” is in need of being supplemented with further material, and specifically with 
the location of the alleged rain, if the utterance of that sentence is to be recognized as 
having the truth-conditions it really has in its context. Example (4), at first sight, does 
not appear as a case of incompleteness at all. it is credited with incompleteness only 
after considering that it too is subject to contextual variation in the truth-evaluation of 
its utterances, insofar as the explanation envisaged for such variation is that the sen-
tence uttered does not determine the truth-conditions of its utterances completely. in 
this case, it will be said that the truth-conditions of utterances of (4) need to be sup-
plemented with material from the context, namely, the form in which milk is said to be 
present in the fridge (drinkable milk in an appropriate container as opposed to drops 
of spilt milk at the bottom and on the walls). 
These are the lines of reasoning, slightly different in different cases, along which sen-
tences (1)-(4) may all appear to call for a completion or fleshing out of truth-conditions 
with material from their context of utterance (sperber and Wilson 1986, travis 2000, 
Bezuidenhout 2002, carston 2002). The argument appears as apt to introduce contex-
tualism in general (its most intuitive case, ia (1), suggests an indexicalist solution to the 
contextualist puzzle), but lends particular support to the underdeterminacy or radical-
contextualist solution, which is implicit in its least intuitive application, ia (4).
3. Cappelen and Lepore on the Incompleteness Argument
The incompleteness argument is puzzling in various respects. Why should contextual 
variability in truth-evaluation be traced back to incompleteness of linguistically de-
termined content? Why should the fact that, to assign an utterance a truth-value, it is 
not enough to rely on the result of disquotation, imply that the sentence uttered only 
expresses an incomplete proposition? This connection relies on what may be called the 
incompleteness intuition. to understand what is at issue in the incompleteness argu-
ment, then, it is useful to be clearer about the sources and the implications of this 
intuition.
cappelen and lepore (2005, 156-75), in their defense of semantic minimalism against 
the incompleteness argument, attack the incompleteness intuition. They claim that 
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the very idea that there must be something incomplete in the truth-conditions of the 
sentence uttered is misguided and irrelevant to semantics: what is really at issue is, ac-
cording to them, a matter of ontology. Th us, they attempt to explain away the incom-
pleteness intuition as prompted by metaphysical worries. Their discussion highlights 
two main kinds of such worries: those concerning semantic entities and those con-
cerning states of affairs in the world.
as to semantic entities, cappelen and lepore depict contextualists as believing that 
expressions such as, “the proposition that John is ready for an exam” pick out a real 
proposition, while expressions such as “the proposition that John is ready” fail to do 
so. This standpoint is, they point out, arbitrary: if there are ontological problems with 
one of these alleged propositions, they should affect the other as well. against contex-
tualists, cappelen and lepore maintain that disquotation suffices to identify, for each 
sentence, a “minimal semantic proposition”, which can then be accepted as a semantic 
entity.
as to states of affairs in the world, the problem which actually worries the contextual-
ists is, according to cappelen and lepore, how to cut the world into states of affairs. 
They describe the contextualist’s incompleteness intuition as a feeling that a sentence 
such as “John is ready” or “it’s raining” does not by itself enable us to understand (to 
borrow Wittgenstein’s idea from the Tractatus) what the world is like when it is true, 
and thus does not by itself represent a (possible) state of affairs. cappelen and lepore 
attribute to the contextualists the belief that this is so because there is no such state of 
affairs, while other states of affairs, more finely cut, do exist and can be represented, 
not so much by sentences but by contextualized utterances thereof. The contextualists 
are thus depicted as in search of the right degree of finesse in cutting the world into 
states of affairs, that is, as wondering how finely cut entities states of affairs are. But, 
cappelen and lepore claim, whether there can be a state of affairs such as John’s being 
ready or, rather, there can exist only more finely cut ones such as John’s being ready for 
an exam or John’s being ready to go out, is a matter of the ontological structure of the 
world (of its building blocks, so to speak), not a matter of meaning, and is therefore 
irrelevant to semantics. 
Does this two-fold criticism yield a fair diagnosis of the flaws of the incompleteness 
argument? two main doubts may be cast upon it, respectively concerning (i) the al-
leged arbitrariness in the application of the incompleteness intuition and (ii) the idea 
that the incompleteness intuition expresses metaphysical worries about the building 
blocks of the world.
(i) The claim that the incompleteness intuition applies to semantic entities arbitrarily 
is the ontological facet of the claim that contextualism is liable to generate some kind 
of infinite regress, that is, that once we agree to supplement the disquotational content 
of a sentence with material from its context of utterance, there is no principled way to 
decide where and when to stop. cappelen and lepore (2005, 63-5), relying on travis 
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(1985), exploit this idea (also endorsed by Bianchi 2001 in support of radical contex-
tualism) to argue that, if the incompleteness argument is valid, indexicalism (which 
amounts for them to moderate contextualism) collapses into radical contextualism. 
But is the disquotational content of an uttered sentence always equally in need of being 
supplemented? indeed, if the incompleteness intuition can in principle arise as regards 
any sentence (it is very likely to do so, if it can arise with our example (4)), it can also 
arise as regards sentences constructed by adding to the contextualist’s examples the 
linguistic specification, in non-indexical terms, of context-dependent details. But if we 
examine specific examples more closely, we see that there are situations in which ob-
jective salience factors block the recursive application of the incompleteness intuition. 
consider
(3) it’s raining.
if it’s raining in trieste, it may be raining in one neighbourhood or other and we might 
need to be more precise about which neighbourhood it is in which it is raining. More 
precisely if it is raining in the neighbourhood of opicina, it might be the case that it 
is raining precisely in my garden (and not in other areas of the same neighbourhood). 
But should, or even could, we describe the situation in more detail? can a state of af-
fairs such as its being raining be located, say, on my horse-chestnut? or on its eastward 
most leaf? Would such more “precise” locations still be locations of the same event, 
rain, or of an event of a different kind? or consider 
(1) John is ready. 
once it is specified that John is ready for an exam, rather than (say) ready to go out, 
would further information about the exam, e.g. its subject matter, still make a differ-
ence to the truth-conditions of an utterance of that sentence and therefore to the prop-
osition it expresses? it seems it would not – unless John is expected to take two exams 
but is only actually ready for one, which however would be a case of ambiguity, not of 
underdeterminacy. But if, given an ontology of semantic entities, there are limits to 
what we can reasonably consider as incomplete, then there must be principled ways of 
distinguishing complete semantic entities from incomplete ones, and the incomplete-
ness intuition does not apply arbitrarily.
(ii) as regards the second criticism that cappelen and lepore level at the incomplete-
ness intuition, it can be conceded to them that there is some connection between the 
incompleteness intuition and certain metaphysical worries about the building blocks 
of the world. When one wonders in what respects and in how much detail the state 
of affairs that an utterance affirms to hold has to be depicted by the sentence uttered 
for the utterance to be truth-evaluable, what he or she is concerned with is not only a 
matter of semantics, that is, of assigning a meaning or content or a semantic value to a 
string of linguistic symbols, but at least in part a matter of ontology. indeed, assuming 
a picture of the world as consisting of states of affairs and a picture of the truth-evalua-
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bility of an utterance of a sentence as its yielding a representation of a possible state of 
affairs, in order for the utterance of a sentence to be truth-evaluable what it represents 
should qualify as a possible state of affairs, that is, something such that, if it were the 
case, would be a building block of the world. Whether it so qualifies depends on what 
kind of entities states of affairs are. 
But, while metaphysical assumptions about states of affairs as building blocks of the 
world can be recognized as playing some role in prompting the incompleteness intui-
tion, the question about the kind and degree of detail in which the state of affairs that 
an utterance affirms to hold has to be depicted by the sentence uttered for the utter-
ance to be truth-evaluable cannot be reduced to a metaphysical question. indeed, it is 
not concerned with the structure of the world per se. rather, it is a question of what it 
is for an utterance to represent a possible state of affairs (correctly or incorrectly) and 
of what it is for us to understand what the world is like when the utterance is true. 
These problems are left untouched even if the metaphysical problem of the structure of 
the world per se is solved (or dissolved). 
4. Contextualism and the incompleteness intuition
i have argued that cappelen and lepore’s criticism of the incompleteness argument 
does not yield a completely fair diagnosis of its flaws. however, from the exposition 
and discussion of that criticism two puzzling aspects of the incompleteness intuition 
have emerged, which a contextualist theory of language should address: the arbitrari-
ness in its application, yielding liability to infinite regress, and its relationship with 
metaphysical worries about semantic ontology. are these inevitable features of contex-
tualism? can we explain away the liability of the incompleteness intuition to infinite 
regress without giving up contextualism altogether? can contextualism co-exist with a 
semantic ontology not generating metaphysical worries?
4.1. Incompleteness and the nature of context
What exactly makes the application of the incompleteness intuition liable to infinite 
regress? i suspect that it depends at least in part on the basically cognitive, and there-
fore epistemic, character of the conception of context upon which contextualists are 
inclined to rely. cognitive context consists of assumptions (whether of each individual 
participant or shared: i shall assume the former, because the difference is not directly 
relevant to our discussion, and because there is a tendency in the relevant literature to 
focus on the speaker’s assumptions, defining the “common ground” as the set of those 
assumptions of the speaker that are also taken by him or her to be shared by hearers; 
cp. stalnaker 2002). These assumptions describe parts and aspects of the world, such as 
objects (and the states in which they are) and events. since (as is generally recognized) 
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any individual object or event, in spite of its unity, is in principle liable to be given an 
endless series of true descriptions, a person’s awareness of the very same individual 
object or event may well generate a potentially unlimited series of assumptions about 
it. it is true that we cannot be aware of an unlimited number of assumptions at the 
same time. But still, with time, we can shift the focus of our attention and develop 
our awareness of the same object or event into a series of assumptions which has no 
principled limitation. When contextualists come to think that, before assessing an ut-
terance as true or false, they need further information about what it says the world to 
be like, and look for such information in the speaker’s cognitive context, it is as if they 
are asking the speaker for more and more detailed descriptions of the object, the state 
of the world, or the event at issue. There is no principled limit to the details that may 
be provided. it is therefore not surprising if, once the uttered sentence is supplemented 
with material from the context, its supplemented version, in which the relevant infor-
mation is cast and which is meant to specify the expressed proposition, fails again to 
be exhaustive and turns out to need further supplementation.
now, while description is an endless task, the world itself does not seem to be so made 
that every object or event in it can be split into parts or components in a potentially 
infinite number of ways without their ceasing to be what they are. an individual ob-
ject, for example, is the object it is insofar as it behaves as a unit. We can refer to it 
insofar as we perceive it as a unit and zooming in on it beyond a certain detail does 
not give us a better grasp of it; rather, it may make us lose sight of it: reference to it 
cannot be reduced to, or replaced by, reference to its parts. The resistance individual 
objects thus display to being dealt with in terms disregarding their role as units is part 
of the constraints things and events in the world put on the ways in which one can deal 
with them. an objective, rather than cognitive, conception of context embodying such 
a constraint-setting function could help dispel the arbitrary, potentially never-ending 
character of the incompleteness intuition.
such a conception of context has been developed and argued for by Gauker (1998, 
2003, 2008b). in Gauker’s objective contextualism, the context of a conversation is de-
termined by how the world is and comprises what participants in the conversation 
should assert, or anyway take to be assertible, in order to optimize their chances of 
coordinating satisfactorily with one another in performing the activity in which their 
conversation is framed. such a context is objective, as opposed to cognitive, since what 
portions of the world are indeed relevant to the ongoing activity and what these are 
actually like does not amount to anybody’s cognitive state or depend on the cognitive 
states of the participants. it is also mind-transcendent, as Gauker emphasizes, because 
what portions of the world are relevant to the ongoing activity and what these actu-
ally are like may well be unknown to the participants (2003; 2008b, 152 ff.). Gauker’s 
reference to assertibility in his definition of context (2003, 59-60) might be misleading, 
since it seems to recall epistemic requirements such as the availability of verification 
procedures, while the notion of assertibility in force is as objective as the same author’s 
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notion of context. a sentence which is assertible in a context is for Gauker, basically, 
a sentence which it would be helpful for the participants to assert in that conversation 
(unless they all take it to be true already). Thus, a sentence’s being assertible or not ulti-
mately depends, for him, on what in the world is actually helpful to the achievement of 
the goal of the ongoing conversation. it is true that such a goal is not itself an objective 
matter, since it is the participants who set it. But once the goal of the conversation is 
set, it is up to the world and not to the participants what sentences are assertible in the 
context and what sentences are not. once an objective conception of context such as 
Gauker’s is adopted, the search for additional information, which contextualists claim 
we are committed to whenever we set out to assess an utterance as true or false, can 
easily be brought to a stop. for there will be a convenient degree of detail, constrained 
by the way the world is (as itself a determinant of context), for the reformulations of 
any given uttered sentence that may be prompted by the incompleteness intuition. We 
will come back to this below.
4.2. Incompleteness and propositionalism
let us now turn to the allegedly metaphysical origins of the incompleteness intuition, 
particularly in connection to semantic ontology. it is to be pointed out that strictly 
speaking, what the incompleteness argument claims to be incomplete is not the ut-
tered sentence, but the proposition it expresses. it is taken for granted that full-blown 
meaning has a propositional format, that is, specifies truth-conditions, and this as-
sumption determines the need to supplement the disquotational content of the uttered 
sentence with material from its context of utterance whenever that disquotational con-
tent appears not to be straightforwardly truth-evaluable.
The notion of proposition looms large in contextualism. Both indexicalism and radical 
contextualism admit of propositions in their semantic ontology (as, by the way, cap-
pelen and lepore also do).1 Moreover, both the indexicalist and the underdeterminacy 
solution to the contextualist puzzle let the context-dependent variation in the proposi-
tion expressed bear the burden of explaining the contextual variability of truth-eval-
uations. This does not amount to “propositionalism” in the sense in which that term 
has been introduced by Kent Bach (Bach 2006; cp. Borg 2007, 347), since, obviously 
enough, contextualists do not maintain that “every indexical-free declarative sentence 
expresses a proposition”. But indexicalism and radical contextualism can be said to 
endorse propositionalism in a broader sense, since they make their accounts of the 
contextual variability of truth-evaluations depend essentially on the assumption that 
every meaningful utterance of a declarative sentence expresses a proposition. We may 
1 There are two main ways to define propositions: as sets of possible worlds or as structured entities (ordered pairs 
of propositional components). for our aims, it does not matter which definition is chosen, because they are both 
compatible with the more general idea that propositions constitute the truth-conditional content of speech acts 
and propositional attitudes. 
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characterize indexicalism and radical contextualism, taken together, as “propositional” 
contextualism.
But must contextualism be “propositional”? couldn’t the burden of the context-de-
pendent variation be shifted to the level of the truth/falsity assessment or (as most 
philosophers are used to saying) of “semantic evaluation”? cappelen and lepore come 
close to admitting that if a non-propositional contextualism, relying on direct intui-
tions about “the truth-value of utterances as such”, were possible, it would escape their 
criticism of the incompleteness argument. They reject such a contextualism rather 
hastily:
[...] we don’t know what it is to have intuitions about the truth value of utterances 
as such. if we are asked to have intuitions not about what an utterance says, asserts, 
claims, etc. but just about its truth value, we are at a loss. (cappelen & lepore 2005, 
98)
But the very availability of such an hypothesis may well be worth attentive examination 
as a step in the direction of an “evaluational” contextualism, pursuing the “evaluation-
ist” solution to the contextualist puzzle. in evaluational contextualism, propositions 
would not play the central role they do in “propositional” contextualism (whether in-
dexicalist or radical-contextualist) and could even reveal superfluous entities, to be 
excluded from semantic ontology.
indeed, an “evaluational” contextualism is possible. What is less clear is exactly what 
form it should take and what relationship it should bear to relativism about truth as 
recently put forward and discussed by several authors (see e.g. Kölbel 2002, richard 
2004, recanati 2007). here i will not tackle the second, broader issue, but merely as-
sume (following Macfarlane 2009, 248) that evaluational contextualism can be distin-
guished from relativism because in the former, truth-evaluation depends on the con-
text of the utterance to be assessed, while in the latter, it depends on the context of the 
assessment. as to the form that evaluational contextualism should take, i outline and 
briefly discuss two proposals, one put forward by Macfarlane(2007, 2009), the other 
inspired by Gauker’s objective contextualism (Gauker 2003). a thorough discussion of 
evaluational contextualism should consider other proposals too (e.g. predelli 2005), 
but i take the standpoints of Gauker and Macfarlane as representative of two poles 
between which any attempt to formulate contextualist approaches of the evaluational 
kind could be placed.
4.3. Two kinds of evaluational contextualism
Evaluational contextualism has to explain how the evaluation of an uttered sentence 
can vary not as a result of the expression of different meanings, but at the level of eval-
uation itself. one way to do this is to have the utterance evaluated against something 
that varies with the occasion of utterance. But what is it that can be said to vary like 
this, and how should its variation be represented?
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Macfarlane (2009), adopting a basically Kaplanian terminology (Kaplan 1989), claims 
that utterances of context-sensitive sentences are evaluated against a variable “circum-
stance of the context”. he proposes a distinction, partly inspired by Kompa (2002), be-
tween indexicality and context-sensitivity according to which, while indexical expres-
sions are defined (as usual) as expressions whose content is determined by resorting 
to the context, context-sensitive expressions require contextually set parameters not 
in order to be assigned a content, but to get a semantic evaluation. The resulting con-
textualism, which Macfarlane calls “nonindexical”, is clearly a brand of evaluational 
contextualism in our sense, since it assigns the burden of the context-dependent varia-
tion in truth-evaluation no longer to an alleged context-dependent variation in the 
proposition expressed, but to variability in that which determines truth-evaluation. it 
also clearly opposes the appeal of propositional contextualism to the incompleteness 
intuition: the truth-evaluation of any utterance of a declarative sentence has to resort 
to the world of the context, but this does not make the proposition expressed incom-
plete (Macfarlane 2009, 243-4).
however, it is not easy for Macfarlane to explain how the circumstance of the context 
may vary. indeed, if (as is customary) the circumstance of the context is identified with 
the world of the context tout court, there is little room for such variation. to solve this 
problem, Macfarlane (2009, 237, 244) proposes that the circumstance of the context 
should be represented as a pair, comprising (in addition to the world of the context) a 
context-dependent parameter relevant to the evaluation of what is said by the context-
sensitive utterance. Thus we may obtain different circumstances of the context in the 
very same actual world. since various kinds of parameters could be pertinent, depend-
ing on the kinds of context-sensitive expressions that appear in the uttered sentence, 
there arises a risk analogous (albeit not identical) to that of incompleteness, which is 
a potentially endless proliferation of parameters. Macfarlane’s solution of this further 
problem is to introduce a “counts as” parameter, which settles what things have to be 
like in order to have a given property and which is defined as a function from proper-
ties to w-intensions (where “w-intensions” are functions from worlds to extensions) 
(2009, 246; cp. Macfarlane 2007). he claims that the introduction of such a parameter 
suffices to block the proliferation of new parameters. although i find Macfarlane’s way 
of tackling the contextualist puzzle very interesting, it is not clear to me whether his 
“counts as” parameter actually manages to account for variability in semantic evalu-
ation in a unified manner. indeed, given the complexity of the factors determining 
context-sensitivity at the level of evaluation, it is difficult to figure out a set of values 
for such a parameter belonging to one and the same dimension. Moreover, since in-
tension belongs with content, one may wonder whether the “counts as” parameter, as 
a function from properties to w-intensions, can really contribute to determining the 
semantic evaluation of the utterance without getting entangled at the same time with 
the level of content, which might lead Macfarlane’s theory back to propositional con-
textualism.
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a different way of explaining how the circumstance of the context varies follows from 
the objective contextualism put forward by Gauker (1998, 2003): the “circumstance of 
the context”, in this perspective, amounts to the objective context itself, which is no 
longer an entire world (whether on its own or in a pair with a parameter), but a selec-
tion from the pertinent world, guided by the goal of the ongoing conversation. it is 
obvious that such a selection varies with the goal of the conversation. and, as has been 
noted above, in this case no incompleteness problem or other infinite regress problem 
arises, since the way the world is will constrain the degree of detail required of a sen-
tence in order to be assertible (or deniable) and therefore true or false in its context.
so, evaluational contextualism has at least two ways of acknowledging what we might 
call the situatedness of the circumstance of evaluation: by recognizing it to be deter-
mined in a context-dependent way, or by assigning the evaluational role to context 
itself (which may be done if it is conceived of as objective, as proposed by Gauker). 
in both cases, by placing the burden of the context-dependent variation directly on 
the process of evaluation, evaluational contextualism has no need to assume that the 
propositions expressed by utterances of the same sentence change with context or, a 
fortiori, that they change by being supplemented on different occasions with different 
material from the context. But for this very reason, evaluational contextualism could 
even question the existence of propositions. should it admit of propositions at all? is 
it still in need of intermediate entities between sentences and truth-evaluations? or 
would it profit from dropping propositions altogether?
The proposals put forward by Gauker (2003) and by Macfarlane (2009) are on op-
posite sides with respect to these questions. Macfarlane’s nonindexical contextualism 
does not challenge the notion of content, which remains the intermediary between 
linguistic expressions and their semantic values, or that of proposition. This may be 
an advantage for his perspective, since it enables us to give a simple name to the en-
tity which is subject to truth-evaluation, and keeps the discussion within the overall 
framework of a semantic theory envisaging the received steps: from character to con-
tent or intension, from content to semantic value or extension. one problem is that 
the “counts as” parameter may not be suitable for coping with all kinds of context-
sensitivity phenomena at the sole level of truth-evaluation. Gauker is critical of the re-
ceived notion of content and therefore of propositions (see e.g. 2003, 5, 68), which his 
objective contextualism tends to abandon, assigning truth and falsity not to the propo-
sitions expressed by utterances of sentences nor to sentences as such, but to sentences 
in context (2003, 191 ff.). his view of the nature and role of context presents each sen-
tence which is assertible in a context as bearing a connection, going beyond its formal 
relations and actual epistemic acknowledgement, to the other sentences that are assert-
ible in that context, such that taking one such sentence to be true leads the participants 
in the conversation to the achievement of their goal only insofar as the others too are 
taken to be true (cp. Gauker 2003, 56-7). Dispensing with propositions by focusing 
on sentences in context has an advantage, since it provides a radical solution to all the 
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puzzles posed by the incompleteness intuition. if there are no propositions, there is no 
issue of whether an alleged proposition is complete or not, no issue of incompleteness, 
no delusion of supporting contextualism by appealing to an incompleteness intuition. 
The objectively determined connection of each sentence which is assertible in a con-
text with other sentences in the context may be exploited to shed light on the phenom-
ena which, within propositional contextualism, prompt the incompleteness intuition. 
The main disadvantage of such a view is that it is highly demanding in terms of the re-
conceptualization of many aspects of semantic theory and of their reformulation into a 
proposition-free semantic metalanguage.2
here, i will not argue for one of these two ways towards evaluational contextualism 
against the other. for the aims of the present paper, it suffices to show that either is 
available. With the aim of showing how an evaluationist solution to the contextualist 
puzzle can be put to work, in the next section i will tentatively apply Gauker’s objective 
contextualism (or more precisely, my reading thereof) to our initial examples (1)-(4).
5. Disposing of incompleteness: a contextualist way
so let us see what happens if we drop propositions and apply the conception of objective 
context outlined above to sentences whose utterances have been recognized to display 
contextual variability in their evaluations as to truth and falsity. if nina announces
(1) John is ready
to paul who is waiting for him to go out together, the sentence “John is expected to 
come” belongs to the set of sentences that specifies the context and the participants 
in the conversation either assume, or should assume it to be true. if some participant 
does not entertain this assumption, 
it makes sense for nina to actually utter that sentence, unless that participant can be 
expected to retrieve it by him or herself (for example, by reasoning from some Gricean 
maxim or other heuristic principle). if nina states 
(2) The apple is red 
while sorting sound apples from apples with red spots in their flesh, sentences such 
as “red apples have red spots in their flesh” belong to the set of sentences specifying 
the context; if, indeed, the participants in the conversation are unlikely to utter such 
sentences, this is only because it is clear enough from the ongoing activity that what 
is at issue is whether apples are red in their flesh. for example, nina would certainly 
address an utterance such as “red apples have red spots in their flesh” to a newcomer 
who has volunteered to help. 
2 Gauker seems to admit this diffi  culty in his 2008a, 361, where he agrees, for his purposes there, to speak of ut-
terances as expressing propositions.
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if nina reports to paul 
(3) it’s raining 
after exploring on the web what the weather is like at the location for which they are 
leaving, the set of sentences specifying the context is limited to sentences spelling out 
data about weather for that location and whoever understands (3) as describing the 
weather state for the location at which they currently are misunderstands not merely 
nina’s utterance but the activity in which she and Jack are are engaged. The set of sen-
tences specifying the context comprises “nina and paul are leaving for cortina” and 
“nina has read on the web what the weather is like in cortina”, which are unlikely to be 
uttered insofar as the participants in the conversation, nina and paul, are both already 
aware they hold. for the same reason, also “it is raining in cortina” belongs to the set 
of sentences specifying the context, but is unlikely to be uttered. We would replace (3) 
with “it is raining in cortina” only if we had reason to believe that a participant in the 
conversation does not realize what is at issue. finally, if nina protests
(4) There is milk in the fridge
after noticing that paul (who was expected to clean up the fridge) has left it dirty, the 
set of sentences specifying the context does not contain either “There is half a pint of 
skimmed milk in the fridge” or its negation (it is not relevant for the current activity 
whether there happens to be a half-a-pint carton of milk in the fridge or not), while it 
contains “The fridge has not been cleaned up properly”. it is in the background of the 
context, and therefore in the context of other sentences, that any sentence we utter can 
perform its job. These other sentences do not need to be uttered; but, for example, if 
paul who was expected to clean up the fridge has forgotten to and replies to (4) “no, 
thanks, i don’t drink milk”, nina will have to spell out some of them in order to remind 
him of those aspects of the situation which are relevant to what she was intending to 
do with her utterance (i.e. reproach paul for not cleaning up the fridge).
in all of these cases, what in propositional contextualism appears as a need of supple-
menting something incomplete may be dealt with by specifying the context against 
which the uttered sentence has to be evaluated. The sentence itself, or whatever it may be 
said to “express”, is not incomplete, but any use of it is situated. The incompleteness intu-
ition appears therefore to be a misleading response to the situatedness of our speech.
The contextualist intuition that the evaluation of the utterances of sentences such as 
(1)-(4) as true or false varies with context is not undermined if we dismiss incom-
pleteness this way. indeed, in order to understand the utterance of a sentence and to 
evaluate it as true or false, we need to collocate that sentence among others, which are 
determined by the occasion of utterance. so, it still holds that the same sentence, in the 
same world, is assertible and therefore true in a context which associates it with a cer-
tain set of sentences, while it fails to be assertible or even turns out to be deniable, and 
therefore false, in a context which associates it with a certain other set of sentences. an 
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utterance of (1), for example, may well be deemed true in a context which associates 
it with “John is expected to come”, while (in the same world and at the same time) it 
should be deemed false if the context were such as to associate it with “John has to take 
an exam tomorrow”. an utterance of (2) may be deemed true in a context which asso-
ciates it with “red apples have red spots in their flesh”, while (in the same world and at 
the same time) it should be deemed false if the context were such as to associate it with 
“red apples have red skin”. an utterance of (3) may be deemed true in a context which 
associates it with “nina has read on the web what the weather is like in cortina” and 
with “it is raining in cortina”, while it should be deemed false if the context were such 
as to associate it with “nina and paul are going out for a walk”, “it is sunny in london”. 
an utterance of (4) may be deemed true in a context which associates it with “The 
fridge has not been cleaned up properly”, while it should be deemed false if the context 
were such as to associate it with “There is no carton of milk in the fridge”.
of course, in order to yield a complete treatment of these and other possible exam-
ples in the framework of objective contextualism, many refinements and clarifications 
would be necessary, for example as to the way in which a conversation may determine 
its objective context, the extent to which that context can be specified, the difference 
between a context as specified by the set of sentences objectively helpful with respect 
to the achievement of the goals of a conversation and the participants’ take on the 
context. however, by my tentative discussion of our examples (themselves not meant 
to exhaust the kinds of context-sensitive sentences, nor, for that matter, to suggest a 
typology), i hope to have shown that criticism of the incompleteness argument, far 
from undermining contextualism, may help us acknowledge the necessary situated-
ness of our speech, to which the incompleteness intuition appears to be a misleading 
response. That discussion also suggests that there may be advantages in adopting an 
evaluationist solution to the contextualist puzzle: it is in its light that the incomplete-
ness intuition can be explained away without giving up contextualism.
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